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 1	  
Tiresias, Ovid, Gender and Trouble  
Generic Conversions from Ars into Tristia 
 
The brief story of Tiresias’ punishment in the third book of Ovid’s Metamorphoses (Met. 3.316-
38) becomes a privileged site for mapping the different ways readers can re-interpret episodes of the 
poem in the light of the rest of Ovid’s corpus. Tiresias, the first human uates of the poem, who is 
punished with blindness for voicing what he should have kept silent, can be included among those 
punished artists who double the poet in the Metamorphoses: while Tiresias is condemned for having 
voiced his knowledge of both sexes, Ovid is exiled for giving amatory advice to, and therefore 
knowing, both men and women. Thus the Tiresias episode reads as a pendant to that of Actaeon in 
the same book (the latter explicitly paralleled to Ovid’s fate in Tristia 2.103-8), with the pair 
suggesting a veiled allegory of the carmen and error that caused Ovid’s exile. 
This is far from exhausting the interpretive possibilities of the passage as metapoetic and 
autobiographical, since recognition of Ovid in Tiresias invites further reflections on the interaction 
of gender and genre in the Ars Amatoria and the Metamorphoses. To elicit these different readings, 
the present paper is divided into three freestanding but interconnected sections. After a brief 
foreword on how the story of Tiresias was still used in 2013 as an authoritative myth to legitimate a 
recognisably chauvinistic view of sexual pleasure, the first section analyses the interplay of genders 
in the episode and elaborates further on Genevieve Liveley’s intuition1 that what Tiresias voices is 
essentially a male-authored verdict. It thus examines the connections between this verdict and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Different versions of this paper were presented in Rome, Nottingham, Venice and London. I am most 
grateful to the audiences for their comments, to Christina Tsaknaki for prompting me to work on this 
material again and helping me through it, to Alessandro Barchiesi and Alessandro Schiesaro for supervising 
this project in Venice, and to Catharine Edwards and William Fitzgerald for allowing me to rewrite the paper 
in the light of ‘conversion’. Alex Dressler, Emily Gowers, Philip Hardie and John Henderson helped me 
convert this essay at more than one stage; for its troubling arguments and remaining mistakes, I am of course 
the one to blame.  
1 Liveley (2003). 
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similarly chauvinistic views expressed by the praeceptor of the Ars Amatoria, whose treatment of 
women appears as peculiarly different from that which emerges in the Metamorphoses. This 
observation cues interplay of literary genres in the episode, with Tiresias providing a point of 
contact between elegy and epic, and signalling Ovid’s different attitudes towards women and sexual 
pleasure in the two poems. This second section explores how Tiresias’ metamorphosis into the blind 
uates of the myth of Narcissus accords with the trajectory of Ovid’s literary career. Finally, the 
paper turns to a reading of the episode as a double for Ovid’s exile in the light of the Tristia, and 
ends by suggesting that this conspirational reading bears directly on the character of Livia and her 
involvement in Ovid’s punishment. Having started by reading mythological Juno anachronistically 
as an outraged feminist, we end by interpreting the episode as an allegory of the anger of outraged 
historical Livia at the frivolity and sexual liberty of the Ars. Which prompts deeper questions 
concerning generic interplay within Augustus’ household: does Ovid’s Tiresias episode moot the 
paradoxical possibility that a woman might wield imperial power? 
 
1. A Foreword on Reception: Tiresias in Blue is the Warmest Colour 
 
The tragic nature of the character of Tiresias as the blind prophet of Thebes has never been 
questioned. On the contrary, the earlier story of Tiresias the judge, the man summoned by Zeus and 
Hera in order to settle upon whether men or women experience more pleasure in sex, seems bound 
to be wrongly associated with trivial matters. In its latest rendition, in Abdellatif Kechiche’s 2013 
Palme d’Or film Blue is the Warmest Colour (orig. La Vie d’Adèle), the tale still features as an 
appropriate topic for banquet chitchat, but it delivers consistent ideological meaning. The episode 
that hosts Tiresias’ quick cameo arrives almost at the centre of a film that will be especially 
remembered for its long and intense scenes of lesbian sex. After becoming more than acquainted 
with the variously depicted expressions of lust between the two protagonists, Adèle (Adèle 
Exharchopoulos) and Emma (Léa Seydoux), we finally manage to see the couple in a social 
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situation, when a party is given in Emma’s house. It is here that Joachim (Stéphane Mercoyrol), one 
of the very few male guests at the party and an otherwise relatively marginal character, is granted 
the honour of spelling out the real subject of Kechiche’s research, when he shares his thoughts on 
the mystery of women’s sexual pleasure. From the height of his bisexual experience, Joachim 
defines women’s orgasm as a sacred and ‘mystical’ event,2 which has nothing to do with the prosaic 
banality of masculine coitus (‘insofar as I’m a man, everything I glimpse is frustrated by the limits 
of male sexuality’), and we are invited to remember Emma’s and Adèle’s facial expressions as he 
goes on to argue with remarkable confidence that women definitely enter into a different universe 
while they are experiencing sexual pleasure. In this apparently frivolous modern sympotic vignette, 
Joachim exploits Tiresias as an example from an authoritative past to sustain a certain line of 
reasoning: as proved by the myth of the man who had experienced both sexes,3 even the Greeks 
knew perfectly well that women enjoy much more sexual pleasure than men. 
Now, as the female audience of this speech seems to enjoy and partially agree with these 
apparently profound reflections, Joachim avoids mentioning the one section of the story that is 
neither applicable to his argument nor to the film’s scenario, namely the story of Juno’s anger in 
hearing Tiresias’ verdict, and Tiresias’ subsequent punishment. Clearly, this part of the story would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The adjective closely recalls Lacan’s parallel between the ecstasy of the mystics and women’s inability 
to understand their own sexual pleasure, which he put forward in writing about Bernini’s statue of an ecstatic 
Saint Teresa, see Lacan (1982), 47: ‘it’s clear that the essential testimony of the mystics is that of saying they 
experience it but know nothing about it.’ On Irigaray’s reply and on the possible connections between the 
contents of their debate and Ovid’s Tiresias, see Liveley (2003). 
3 Note that throughout the essay I will try to maintain the distinction between sex (the biological makeup 
of an individual’s reproductive anatomy) and gender (the socially constructed sexual identity of an individual 
or else their own subjective perception of their sexual identity).  
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have profited no one in the film. Surprisingly, not one of these purportedly lesbian characters4 
ventures to suggest that Joachim is either implying that he must be unbelievably skilled, or that he 
has just seen, with us, Adèle and Emma in Kechiche’s film, so turning Tiresias’ verdict into an 
indirect praise of the director himself. Albeit arguably a parody of the intellectual chitchat of the 
French bourgeoisie,5 Joachim’s speech, at the very centre of the film, perfectly encapsulates the 
problematic and controversial messages of Blue is the Warmest Colour. 
The ideological scandals of this speech, and indeed of the whole film, have not gone unnoticed.6 
Kechiche may well be satirizing the French bourgeoisie more generally in the scene, but Joachim’s 
speech is in any case made authoritative by its freight of self-referentiality and metacinematicity. 
When he claims that ‘ever since women have been shown in paintings, their ecstasy is shown more 
than men’s, whose is shown via women’, he is in fact mediating Kechiche’s unsolicited apology for 
his own use of the ‘male gaze’ throughout the film.7 In this speech, Joachim and the artist fuse into 
one character, at the expense of all the female characters on the screen, protagonists included. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 On the impression that lesbians are actually absent from the film, see the criticisms of Julie Maroh 
(2013), author of the graphic novel on which the film is based (Le bleu est une couleur chaude), and the 
reactions of Peter Bradshaw (2013) from The Guardian and Owen Gleiberman (2013) from Entertainment 
Weekly.  
5  As Kechiche himself states in the interview included in Cannes’ press kit (http://www.festival-
cannes.fr/assets/Image/Direct/049301.pdf, viewed on 15/08/2014), the main interest of the film lies in the 
social differences between Adèle and Emma, which eventually cause their break-up. Yet the film does not 
apparently take sides with one class or the other: the portrait of Adèle’s working-class family comes across 
as an uncompassionate caricature no less than that of Emma’s high-brow party guests. 
6 The film stirred more uproar and critique from feminist and lesbian circles than I could possibly rehearse 
here. Apart from Julie Maroh’s blog, I recommend the articles by Manhola Dargis (2013) from the New York 
Times and Sophie Mayer (2013) from Sight & Sound. 
7 A concept made famous by Mulvey (1975). Joachim alludes to the same works of art that the viewers 
saw on screen when Emma and Adèle had a tour of the Museum La Piscine in Roubaix.  
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similar fusion, I shall argue, is activated between the Tiresias of Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Ovid 
as the praeceptor amoris of the Ars Amatoria in terms of their approach to women’s sexual 
pleasure. One of the troubles with Joachim’s speech, as indeed with Tiresias’ judgement, is that in a 
film which has lesbian love, or at least female sexuality, as its main focus, the superiority of female 
orgasm must be expressed not just visually by the male director, but verbally by one of the very few 
male characters in a clear intellectual liaison with the director. Kechiche and Joachim, like their 
counterpart Tiresias long before them, not only prove that heterosexual sex is still centre-stage, but 
more importantly hide an indirect compliment to masculine skills behind the pretence of giving 
voice – finally – to unbridled female sexuality, since the corollary of Tiresias’ argument reads that 
men are better at providing the pleasure that women are more likely to enjoy.8 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As Sophie Mayer (2013) points out, the film, ‘premiered at Cannes close to the signing of the same-sex 
marriage bill in France, [only] appears to confirm a post-homophobic culture’ (my emphasis). On the 
surface, Kechiche does seem to give voice to female sexuality and homosexuality, but on closer inspection 
one finds out that this only happens according to the discourse and norms of the dominant gender: 
Kechiche’s female homosexuality, inscribed in just another ‘phallocentric history’, becomes just another 
instance of Irigaray’s ‘Female Hom(m)osexuality’, whose claims are ‘not enough to raise doubts about the 
privilege of the phallus’: see Irigaray (1985), 98-103. Joachim’s speech is a clear example of this, as is 
Kechiche’s visual use of the ‘male gaze’, but it also needs emphasising, with Mayer, that in the film ‘every 
verbal and visual reference is to the work of male artists’: in particular, Kechiche adopts Pierre de 
Marivaux’s La vie de Marianne as the signature tune for the story. According to Mayer, Marivaux’s ‘male 
inscription of a female first-person point of view appears to license Kechiche’s own’. Similarly, as regards 
Ovid’s Tiresias, Liveley (2003), 153-4, notes that the females, Juno and Venus, are silenced throughout the 
episode, whereas the authority to speak is conferred on the male characters, Jupiter and ‘“man-made-woman-
made-man” Tiresias’. In a line of reasoning slightly different from mine, Liveley (2003), 156-7, finds a 
possible cause of Juno’s anger in this repression of the female voice activated by Jupiter through the choice 
of letting Tiresias speak, since he is, after all, a ‘man-made-woman, a figure who is… first and foremost a 
man’. Similarly, Fabre-Serris (2011), 117-118, emphasises the male perspective of the whole of 
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2. Gender Conversions: Tiresias/Ovid as Praeceptor Amoris 
 
Different interpretations have been proposed to solve what has been considered the mystery of 
this version of Tiresias’ myth,9 namely the cause of Juno’s anger. As regards the Greek sources, the 
most likely explanation is the rivalry between Hera and Aphrodite as the goddesses of matrimonial 
and sexual love respectively. Tiresias’ reminder of women’s enjoyment of sexual pleasure would 
constitute a recognition of Aphrodite’s power and consequently an outrage for the goddess of 
marriage and monogamy.10 When applied to the Metamorphoses, this interpretation also turns 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Metamorphoses 3, and identifies Tiresias’ fault in having taken part, as a man, in the mysteries of women’s 
sexual pleasure. 
9 Ovid’s version dates back to the lost Melampody attributed to Hesiod, as attested by Ps.-Apollod. Bibl. 
3.6.7, Schol. Hom. Od. 10.494 (ii. 475 Dindorf), Schol. Lycophr. 683 (ii. 226 Scheer) and Phleg. Mirab. 4. 
(pp. 73-4 Keller), see Hesiod, F 275 in Merkelbach – West (1967), 134-6. For other variants of this version 
see Brisson (1976), 11-77 and Ugolini (1995), 33-65. A different version of the myth, where Tiresias is 
blinded by Athena after having accidentally seen her naked, famously narrated by Callimachus (Hymn. 5.75-
130), is attested in Pherekydes (Ps.-Apollod. Bibl. 3.6.7 = Pherekydes FGrHist 3 F 92a), Propertius 4.9.57-8 
and Nonnus Dion. 5.337-45: see Brisson (1976), 21-77 and Ugolini (1995), 66-78. A mysterious third 
version, where Tiresias undergoes six sex-changes and is finally transformed into a mouse, was transmitted 
by Eustathius in his commentary to Odyssey 10 and is said to derive from an elegiac poem by Sostratus 
(Eust. ad Od. 10.494, 1665.48ff. Stallbaum). On this version, see Brisson (1976), 84-111 and (1995), 103-27, 
Ugolini (1995), 100-10, O’Hara (1996) and Ceccarelli (2010).     
10 See Brisson (1976), 33-4, Loraux (1989), 17, Ugolini (1995), 60. Another interpretation is that Tiresias 
is punished for revealing and violating the secrets of women: see Loraux (1989), 253-71, Ugolini (1995), 60, 
Fabre-Serris (2011), 107. On the basis of the connections between Tiresias’ myth and an episode of the 
Indian Mahâbhârata, where a man who was transformed into a woman by bathing in a river tells the Indian 
god Indra (correspondent of Zeus) that he prefers to remain a woman because women enjoy greater pleasure 
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Tiresias’ verdict into an indirect approval of Jupiter’s extramarital affairs, whose cause was after all 
always Venus qua sexual libido, and Tiresias’ judgement must then sound to Juno’s ears like an 
unwelcome confirmation of the pleasure experienced by other women in sexual intercourse with her 
husband.11 In the episode immediately preceding that of Tiresias (Met. 3.253-315), Juno had just 
punished Semele with a kind of ‘contrapasso through analogy’12 based on Semele’s desire to 
experience sexual pleasure with Jupiter at its highest possible power: thanks to Juno’s advice, the 
Theban woman gets what she deserves and asked for, an orgasm at full blast, elicited by the joint 
power of Juno and her rival Venus.13 And yet, Juno may also be read as a feminist ante litteram in a 
recognisably chauvinistic world which, according to Kechiche’s film, would seem to have remained 
quite unchanged in more than 2000 years. The reason for Juno’s anger is in my view grounded in 
the misogynistic nature of Tiresias’ statement, which also reflects Ovid’s own take on women’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in love than men, Krappe (1928) speculated that in an older version of the myth Hera punished Tiresias by 
changing her into a man again. There seems to be no ground for such speculation (see Ugolini [1995], 58-9), 
but the Sostratus version (see n. 9) does attest a change of sex as Hera’s punishment, although from man to 
woman, rather than from woman to man.  
11 For a similar line of reasoning, see Anderson (1997), 369, who adds that ‘Juno had every right to 
disagree in view of the rarity of her uoluptas’. At 371, Anderson concludes that Tiresias is blinded ‘as a sign 
that he woefully lacks basic knowledge about men, women, and sex’. See contra Barchiesi in Barchiesi – 
Rosati (2007), 172, arguing that blinding is the punishment reserved for those who have witnessed 
something ‘real’. 
12 Contrapasso is the term used by Dante for the kinds of punishment in the Inferno, where the 
punishments are always in a relation of contrast or analogy with the sin itself.  
13 Cf. Semele’s request, qualem Saturnia… te solet amplecti, Veneris cum foedus initis, / da mihi te talem 
(‘in the same guise as Saturnia is used to your embrace, when you enter the pact of Venus, give yourself to 
me’, Met. 3.293-5) and what sounds like an ironic comment from Juno on Semele’s ‘marriage in death’, 
donis… iugalibus arsit (‘she was burnt by those wedding gifts’, Met. 3.309). Also note Ovid’s allusion to the 
ancient etymology Iuno<iungo, with Prauscello (2008), 569. 
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sexual pleasure in the Ars Amatoria and thus ties poet to prophet in an inextricable bond. I propose 
that Ovid’s Tiresias (who is first of all not as bisexual as he appears at first glance), far from 
embodying with his blindness a sort of Prometheus-figure for women, harshly punished for 
attempting to reveal and establish the authenticity of female sexual pleasure in and against a society 
that strives to relegate women to a mere role of passivity, 14  ends up reinforcing, almost 
paradoxically, the reality of Irigaray’s ‘phallocentric dialectic’ by confirming the supremacy of the 
male point of view in assuming control over female sexual pleasure and desire.  
 
At Met. 3.316-38, after the description of the twofold birth of Bacchus (bis geniti… Bacchi, 
‘Bacchus… born twice’, Met. 3.317), Ovid narrates the story of another Theban character who was 
similarly ‘born twice’,15 if not three times:16  
 
dumque ea per terras fatali lege geruntur 
tutaque bis geniti sunt incunabula Bacchi, 
forte Iouem memorant diffusum nectare curas 
seposuisse graues uacuaque agitasse remissos 
cum Iunone iocos et ‘maior uestra profecto est 
quam quae contigit maribus’ dixisse ‘uoluptas.’ 
illa negat. placuit quae sit sententia docti 
quaerere Tiresiae; Venus huic erat utraque nota. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 A slightly exaggerated version of Loraux’s interpretation of the Greek Tiresias: Loraux (1989), 17-8; 
see also Ugolini (1995), 60. On the nonexistence of women’s libido in the ‘phallocentric dialectic’, see 
Irigaray (1985), esp. 83: ‘neither her libido nor her sex/organs have any right to any “truth” except the truth 
that casts her as “less than”, other side, backside, of the representation thereby perpetuated.’ 
15 Cf. the first words of a kind of reincarnation of Tiresias, Calliope Stephanides, the hermaphrodite 
protagonist of Jeffrey Eugenides’ 2002 novel Middlesex (2003 Pulitzer Prize for Fiction): ‘I was born twice: 
first, as a baby girl, on a remarkably smogless Detroit day in January 1960; and then again, as a teenage boy, 
in an emergency room near Petoskey, Michigan, in August of 1974 … Like Tiresias, I was first one thing 
and then the other…’ (my emphasis). 
16 The text is from Tarrant (2004) unless specified.  
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nam duo magnorum uiridi coeuntia silua 
corpora serpentum baculi uiolauerat ictu 
deque uiro factus (mirabile!) femina septem 
egerat autumnos; octauo rursus eosdem 
uidit et ‘est uestrae si tanta potentia plagae’ 
dixit ‘ut auctoris sortem in contraria mutet, 
nunc quoque uos feriam.’ percussis anguibus isdem 
forma prior rediit genetiuaque uenit imago. 
arbiter hic igitur sumptus de lite iocosa 
dicta Iouis firmat; grauius Saturnia iusto 
nec pro materia fertur doluisse suique 
iudicis aeterna damnauit lumina nocte. 
at pater omnipotens (neque enim licet inrita cuiquam 
facta dei fecisse deo) pro lumine adempto 
scire futura dedit poenamque leuauit honore. 
                                              (Met. 3.316-38) 
 
Now while these things were happening on the earth by the decrees of fate, when the cradle of 
Bacchus, twice born, was safe, it chanced that Jove (as the story goes), relaxed by wine, put 
his weighty cares aside and bandied good-humoured jests with Juno, who shared his leisure. 
‘I maintain’, said he, ‘that your pleasure in love is clearly greater than that which men enjoy.’ 
She denied that this was true. And so they decided to ask the judgement of wise Tiresias: he 
knew both sides of love. For once, with a blow of his staff he had injured two huge serpents 
mating in the green forest; and, wonderful to relate, from man he was changed into a woman, 
and in that form spent seven years. In the eighth year he saw the same serpents again and said: 
‘Since in striking you there is such magic power as to change the nature of the giver of the 
blow, now I will strike you once again.’ So saying, he struck the serpents and his former state 
was restored and he became as he had been born. He therefore, being appointed to arbitrate 
the playful dispute of the gods, confirmed Jupiter’s sentence. Saturnia, they say, grieved more 
deeply than she had right to, and more than the issue warranted, and condemned the eyes of 
her arbitrator to perpetual blindness. But the omnipotent father (for no god may undo what 
another god has done) in return for his loss of sight gave Tiresias the power to know the 
future, lightening the penalty by this honour. 
(tr. Miller – Goold with minor changes) 
 
 
This version of the story has allowed many to speak of Tiresias’ bisexuality,17 but whether one 
takes bisexuality, in relation to antiquity, as indicating an individual’s possession of both 
sexes/genders or, in the modern sense of the word, as referring to their sexual attraction towards 
both males and females, neither of these definitions is an entirely accurate label for Ovid’s Theban 
seer. To start with the modern definition, it is necessary to emphasise that although Tiresias has 
experienced, as an individual, sexual intercourse with both sexes, he ‘does not love male and female 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See for example Carp (1983), passim, Anderson (1997), 370, Michalopoulos (2012), 228 and passim. 
Rimell (2006), 30, more appropriately speaks of gender-bending. 
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with one body, but loves both sequentially – and heterosexually – with a sequentially sexed body’.18 
In other words, since sex change for Tiresias is the condicio sine qua non for experiencing 
bisexuality, he risks becoming a symbol of the all-encompassing hierarchical predominance of 
heterosexual sex and a mythical detractor of bisexuality at the same time.19 On the other hand, if we 
consider bisexuality in the ancient sense, Brisson felt the need to point out that there exists a 
fundamental difference between what he calls ‘simultaneous bisexuality’ (bisexualité simultanée) 
and ‘successive bisexuality’ (bisexualité successive): the former characterises primordial beings, 
like the Androgynoi and the Phoenix, who possess two sexes simultaneously, and can be considered 
to work as ‘archetypes’, the separation of whose constituent opposites will give rise to the Greek 
binary system of reality; the latter category, in which Tiresias falls, includes beings whose 
experience of both opposites has rendered mediators (médiateurs) between various poles of reality’s 
dualism such as, in Tiresias’ case, male/female, divine/human, future/past, Jupiter/Juno, 
active/passive and so on.20 There is, in fact, a huge difference between Tiresias and properly 
bisexual figures like Hermaphroditus, or Lucretius’ androgyne, whose possession of both sexes 
becomes equal to the possession of no sex at all, as in Brisson’s archetypes:21 androgynum, 
interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum (‘the androgyne, between the two sexes, yet not either, 
remote from both’, Lucr. 5.839); nec duo sunt sed forma duplex, nec femina dici / nec puer ut 
possit, neutrumque22 et utrumque uidentur (‘they are not two, but a double form, so that it can 
neither be called woman nor man: it seems to be neither and both’, Ov. Met. 4.378-9). Ovid’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Madden (2008), 45. 
19 Alternatively, Garber (1995), 153-68 and (1999) attempts a reading of Tiresias’ sex change as an 
allegory of bisexuality. 
20 See Brisson (1997), 9-12, and 103-27 on Tiresias as médiateur, on which see also García Gual (1975) 
and Carp (1983).  
21 See Brisson (1997), 10: ‘Posséder les deux sexes, c’est n’en posséder aucun’. 
22 u. l. nec utrumque Ω. 
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Tiresias is not a truly bisexual character: indeed, one may interpret his sex change as the 
punishment for tearing apart with his staff precisely that archetypal androgynous figure created by 
the mating of the two serpents.23 Tiresias’ encounter with the serpents implies not only, as Brisson 
and others have noticed, his always already active connection to prophecy,24 but more significantly 
casts him as a sort of demiurgic figure, a contributor to the development of Greek dualism from 
(Shamanic25) nondualism, to which bisexuality belongs. Thus, he gets to experience what he took 
part in creating: the clear-cut distinction between two distinguished and opposite sexes – precisely 
the opposite of bisexuality.26 
Yet Ovid’s text seems to sustain this line of reasoning up to a point. Not only does it let Tiresias 
spell out the actual dichotomy of the sexes (note the emphasis on in contraria, 32927), but it also 
never lingers on a transsexual – or even transgender – portrait of the seer. Instead, Ovid describes 
his peculiarity as pertaining to the realm of experience rather than to his constituent features: if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Cf. Aristotle’s description of the mating of two serpents, and how it seems to recall the myth of the 
Androgynoi: οὕτω δὲ σφόδρα οἵ γ᾽ ὄφεις περιελίττονται ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἑνὸς ὄφεως δικεφάλου 
εἶναι τὸ σῶμα ἅπαν (‘they coil round one another so tightly that the whole thing looks like one serpent with 
two heads’, Arist. HA 5.4, 540 b 1-3), see Brisson (1976), 55. 
24 On the connections between snakes and prophecy in relation to Tiresias, see Brisson (1976), 46-77, 
Ugolini (1995), 57-8. It is telling that, according to Ps.Apollodorus Bibl. 3.6.7, Tiresias is the grand-son of 
Udeus, one of the spartoi, and therefore offspring of a serpent. 
25 On the possible Shamanic origin of Tiresias’ bisexuality, see García Gual (1975), 119-20, Ugolini 
(1995), 62-3. 
26 Barchiesi seems to imply this when he comments that Tiresias ‘attraversa… la differenza sessuale e le 
sue asimmetrie’ (Barchiesi – Rosati (2007), 174, my emphasis), although the asymmetric relation between 
the sexes will only surface in Tiresias’ verdict.         
27 Liveley (2003), 150, takes this to imply Ovid’s notion of the female sex as ‘other’ much in the same 
sense as Irigaray’s Speculum (1985). 
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Hermaphroditus’ characteristic is based on something that ‘seems’ or could be seen (uidentur, Met. 
4.379), Tiresias’ strength lies in his knowledge, since he ‘knew both Venuses’ (Venus huic erat 
utraque nota, 323). The expression utraque Venus is nevertheless ambiguous,28 pushing Tiresias 
closer to either bisexuality or homosexuality. In Tiresias’ case, it clearly refers to his sexual 
experience both as a man and as a woman, and as such it implies a clear distinction between men’s 
and women’s sexual pleasure. But there is no reason why the expression could not also mean 
‘sexual pleasure with men and women’,29 with the implication that even a male character who has 
had bisexual experiences could have given the same answer. Moreover, the iunctura only appears 
again twice, in both cases originally in Greek, to indicate the experience of both active and passive 
roles in sexual intercourses, either heterosexual or homosexual (both male and female).30 In all three 
cases, it is clear that the dichotomy at stake here is not male/female, but rather active/passive, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See Bömer (1969), 532: ‘Kühne und offenbar singuläre Junktur’. 
29 See Barchiesi – Rosati (2007), 174, and Schrijvers (1985), 31, 43, in relation to Claudius Aelianus’ text 
(see n. 30). 
30 The expression Venus utraque appears twice in Caelius Aurelianus’ fifth century translation of the work 
of the Greek physician Soranos of Ephesus (1st/2nd century CE) On Acute and On Chronic Diseases 
(Chronicarum passionum 4.9.132 and 135). According to Brooten (1996), 151 and 157 n. 43, it denotes in 
both cases ‘active and passive role’, first in relation to women (4.9.132), then in relation to men (4.9.135), 
although the meaning ‘love with both sexes’ (endorsed by Schrijvers [1985], 31, 43) cannot be ruled out. The 
second instance of the expression appears in Claudius Aelianus’ De natura animalium (2nd/3rd century CE) 
with reference to the change of sex of the hyena every year. Since the passage playfully refers explicitly to 
Caeneus and Tiresias, it is highly possible that Aelian has the Ovidian text in mind. In any case, the link 
between the expression ‘both Venuses’ and the active/passive role is clear: κοινωνοῦσί τε ἀφροδίτης 
ἑκατέρας, καὶ γαμοῦσί τε καὶ γαμοῦνται, ἀνὰ ἔτος πᾶν ἀμείβουσαι τὸ γένος (‘they have a share of both 
Venuses, and in mating they are both active and passive, changing their sex/gender each year’, Ael. NA 
1.25). For the idea that Aelian probably knew Ovid’s Metamorphoses, see Smith (2014), 139.        
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Tiresias therefore confirms the ancient view that those who take a passive role indulge more in 
pleasure, and can thus be considered weaker, more ‘feminine’ or ‘effeminate’, as it were, whatever 
their biological sex. This is relevant to the point that Tiresias is after all just another male voice that 
confirms the supremacy of both male sex and male gender: as has already been noted by Liveley,31 
Tiresias, like all the other characters who undergo transformation in the Metamorphoses, remains 
himself in a female body, and although we know that he played a passive role in sex during those 
seven years in which he was a woman, he never really departs from the performative acts of his 
original gender, and can be seen to continue playing an active role in the second encounter with the 
serpents32 as well as to continue embodying a privileged male point of view in his exchange with 
Jupiter and Juno. 
 
Ovid’s Tiresias is therefore a mortal male uates33 whose knowledge of sex from both sides makes 
him a suitable judge to pronounce sententiae about the asymmetry of pleasure in sex between men 
and women. From this point of view specifically, Tiresias shares important traits with the poet of 
the Amores, who claims me legat in sponsi facie non frigida uirgo / et rudis ignoto tactus amore 
puer (‘let me be read by a girl who is not cool in the presence of her promised lover, and by an 
inexperienced boy, touched by unknown love’, Am. 2.1.2), and especially with the praeceptor of the 
Ars Amatoria, whose status of love poet already implies in a certain sense a mixture of virility and 
effeminacy34 and who is thus able to give important advice on love and sex to both men and women 
– although the asymmetry between the two parties is implied by the very structure of the three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Liveley (2003). 
32 According to Liveley (2003), 160, the image of Tiresias striking the snakes with the staff is ‘loaded with 
phallic significance’, all the more so in view of the sexual connotation of uiolauerat at 325. 
33 On Tiresias as uates, see below. 
34 See Sharrock (2002), 98; Fabre-Serris (2011), 101, stresses Ovid’s interest in relating both female and 
male perspectives, while Rimell (2006), 208 n. 4, connects it explicitly, though in passing, to Tiresias. 
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books of the Ars (two books addressed to men, one to women), an asymmetry in no way rectified 
by the addition of the Remedia.35 In the end, for both Tiresias and Ovid, this ability to speak on 
behalf of both sexes will retrospectively prove to be a downright inauspicious gift: carmina fecerunt 
ut me cognoscere uellet / omine non fausto femina uirque meo (‘it was my poems that made women 
and men want to know me, but it was no good omen for me’, Tr. 2.5-6).36  
It is precisely in Tiresias’ verdict that the similarities with the praeceptor come to the fore. Ovid 
starts Tiresias’ episode with intertextual reminiscences of Lucretius that set the stage for an anti-
Lucretian polemic. Indeed, Jupiter’s and Juno’s separation from human matters is emphasised in 
this passage by the strikingly Lucretian compound seposuisse (319), which joins the se- compounds 
used by Lucretius when describing the ἀταραξία of the gods in the intermundia and their total 
indifference to human affairs:37 
 
omnis enim per se diuum natura necessest 
immortali aeuo summa cum pace fruatur 
semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe. 
nam priuata dolore omni, priuata periclis, 
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri, 
nec bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira. 
(Lucr. 1.44-9 = 2.646-51)38 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 On the view that Ars and Remedia were conceived as a four-book poem mirroring the Georgics, see 
Green (2006), 3, with bibliography. On the complicated relationship between the books, see Rimell (2006), 
70-103; Martelli (2013), 69-78, highlights the subordinate role of Ars 3 and Remedia in offering a 
commentary on, rather than an extension of, of the narrative of Ars 1-2.  
36 Cf. Ovid’s advice to Perilla: tantummodo femina nulla / neue uir a scriptis discat amare tuis (‘just try 
not to let any woman nor man learn how to love from your writings’, Tr. 3.7.29-30). 
37 The intertext is noted by Barchiesi in Barchiesi – Rosati (2007), 174. 
38 The lines in Book 1 have long been considered an interpolation and have been expunged by many 
editors: see Bailey (1947), 601-3. 
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For any divine nature must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed 
and separated from our affairs; for without any pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own 
resources, needing us not at all, it is neither propitiated with services nor touched by anger. 
(tr. Rouse with minor changes) 
 
In Tiresias’ episode, Jupiter and Juno are introduced to us as if they were two Lucretian divine 
natures far removed from human troubles. Yet the ending of Tiresias’ story, in line with the 
message of the whole Metamorphoses,39 inevitably subverts this model by showing that these gods 
are not at all unperturbed by human matters, and least of all are they ‘untouched by anger’.40  
This Lucretian intertext anticipates Tiresias’ specifically anti-Lucretian view on sexual pleasure,41 
which matches the same anti-Lucretian stances expressed by the praeceptor in the Ars Amatoria. In 
the finale of DRN 4 (4.1030-1287), Lucretius famously expresses his views on sex and (the dangers 
of) love in what seems like an explicit anti-neoteric stance.42 In his so-called ‘attack on love’, 
Lucretius also espouses the anti-Tiresian theory that sexual pleasure is mutual and symmetrical, and 
he takes care to emphasise his view by constant repetition of the adjectives mutuus and communis 
as applied to the sexual act (see communia… gaudia, 4.1195-6; mutua… uoluptas, 1201; mutua 
gaudia, 1205; communi’ uoluptas, 1207; mutuus ardor, 1216; cf. mutua… gaudia, 5.854; mutua… 
cupido, 5.963).43 It is true that by stressing the existence of a mutual physical pleasure Lucretius 
aims at undermining by contrast the romantic idea of mutual love,44 but the fact that he holds an 
opposing opinion to that found in both Metamorphoses and Ars Amatoria is telling in view of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 On the anti-Lucretian theological approach of the Metamorphoses, see Schiesaro (2002), 63-5. 
40  Cf. Jupiter’s wrath in the Lycaon episode, the first instance of the ‘flawed “theodicy”’ of the 
Metamorphoses, with Anderson (1989). 
41 On Tiresias as an anti-Lucretian uates in the subsequent episode of Narcissus, see Hardie (1988), 86-8. 
42 See Brown (1987), 139-43. 
43 This clearly does not make Lucretius an advocate of sexual equality; rather his concern lies in the 
necessity of a mutual sexual fulfilment for the purposes of a successful conception: see Snyder (1976).  
44 Brown (1987), 311. 
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Ovid’s conscious shaping of his didactic work, the Ars, as a decidedly anti-Lucretian construction.45 
In fact, if Lucretius says, in DRN 5, that it is actually the man who holds an ‘immoderate’ libido, 
uiolenta uiri uis atque impensa libido (‘man’s violent force and immoderate libido’, Lucr. 5.964), 
the praeceptor will instead stress more than once how women’s libido is more ‘furious’ and 
certainly ‘harsher’ than men’s:46 
 
parcior in nobis nec tam furiosa libido 
legitimum finem flamma uirilis habet. 
(Ars 1.281-2) 
 
In us desire is weaker and not so frantic: the manly flame knows a lawful bound. 
(tr. Mozley – Goold) 
 
omnia feminea sunt ista libidine mota; 
acrior est nostra plusque furoris habet. 
(Ars 1.341-2) 
 
All those crimes were prompted by women’s lust; which is harsher than ours, and has more 
madness.  
(tr. Mozley – Goold with minor changes) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 See Sommariva (1980) and Shulman (1981).  
46 Ovid seems to endorse Lucretius’ theory of mutual pleasure in Amores 2.3: mutua nec Veneris gaudia 
nosse potes (‘and you cannot know the mutual pleasures of Venus’, Am. 2.3.2) However, Ovid’s attitude 
towards Lucretius has been seen by Shulman (1981) to become more antagonistic from the Amores into the 
Ars and the Remedia. The sexual pleasure presented in the famous climax of Ars 2 (ad metam properate 
simul: tum plena uoluptas, / cum pariter uicti femina uirque iacent, ‘hurry to the goal at the same time: then 
you’ll find full pleasure, when woman and man lie together, equally beaten’, Ars 2.727-8) is in my view only 
apparently mutual: at Ars 2.719-24, the praeceptor lingers only on the woman’s pleasure, provided to her by 
the man through masturbation (see Rimell [2006], 91); see James (2003), 205: ‘in fact it is no more than a 
restatement of the praeceptor’s typical desire to be in control, to know what his puella is feeling, to keep her 
dependent upon him.’ In James’ reading (2003), 207, the passage fits Tiresias’ verdict perfectly, showing 
that ‘female sexual pleasure… is a sign of male sexual prowess’. 
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In sharing these explicitly chauvinist views, both the praeceptor and Tiresias align themselves 
with Jupiter and provide a learned excuse for the brutality of rape – the rape that women tacitly 
desire, as famously argued in the final section of Ars 1 (1.663-80).47 Ted Hughes’ Juno, when still 
waiting for and wrongly confiding in Tiresias’ response, makes this point rather explicit when 
addressing Jupiter thus:  
 
‘He’ll explain’, cried Juno, ‘why you are  
Slave to your irresistible addiction  
While the poor nymphs you force to share it with you  
Do all they can to shun it.’  
(Hughes (1997) 73) 
 
In Hughes’ rendition, Tiresias is actually given the chance to redeem the chauvinist stances of the 
praeceptor. And yet, he does nothing but reinforce them. 
 
We have thus seen how Tiresias’ verdict explicitly reflects the views on women’s furious libido 
and on their tacit desire for rape that had been expressed by the praeceptor of the Ars. However, it 
is hard to deny that such views are also put under scrutiny or perhaps even undermined by the 
psychological insights into the plight of rape victims displayed throughout the Metamorphoses, in 
which, very differently from the Ars, the only indirect statement about women’s implicit consent to 
rape is precisely Tiresias’ verdict – a statement which unavoidably runs into its deserved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 This section, read together with the rape of the Sabine women (Ars 1.101-34) has been the subject of 
neverending debates: Myerowitz (1985) and (2006) thinks that it is clear that the praeceptor deplores the 
brutality of rape expressed in these episodes, while Hemker (1985) recovers Ovid’s voice as distancing itself 
from that of the praeceptor, but see contra Richlin (1992). Sharrock (2006) speaks of ‘the romanticization of 
force’ as a theme shared by all the digressions of Ars 1.  
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punishment.48 This observation may seem at first sight to invalidate the analogy between Tiresias 
and Ovid proposed so far, but on closer inspection it should become clear that it serves instead to 
back it up. In fact, just like Ovid, Tiresias is a character who undergoes different phases, which 
coincide with one or more changes of literary genre. Thus, the punishment he receives after the 
playful elegiac episode that we have just witnessed will turn him into the real anti-Apollonian and 
anti-Lucretian49 uates of the Metamorphoses: the one who will be in charge of introducing Ovid’s 
masterpiece within Book 3, the pastoral/elegiac/tragic episode of Narcissus, and who will finally 
play his properly dramatic role in the tragedy of Pentheus at the end of the book. The punishment 
that Tiresias receives for his verdict on women in what has been explicitly labelled as no more than 
a ‘playful dispute’50 (lite iocosa, 332) is an analogous watershed to that which marks Ovid’s 
different scopes and approaches between the elegiac corpus and the Metamorphoses. Only after 
recognising the limits and flaws of their elegiac attitudes can both Tiresias and Ovid finally become 
the uates of an epic poem in which sexual matters deserve an undoubtedly more insightful treatment 
than that offered by the problematically chauvinistic stance of the Ars. 
 
3. Genre Conversions: Tiresias/Ovid as uates 
 
It is telling, as we shall see when examining the passage from a post-exilic perspective, that it is 
only after the punishment has occurred that Tiresias can become a real, truth-telling uates. And yet, 
even if one is not ready to accept the connections between Tiresias and the praeceptor of the Ars, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 See Curran (1978), 230, on how the ‘facile cynicism’ of the Ars ‘gives way to a new empathy with 
women and their real wishes’ in the Metamorphoses. But see contra Richlin (1992) on the continuing 
objectification of women in both texts.  
49 See Hardie (1988), 86-8. 
50 On iocus as an intertextual tag for the elegiac discourse of the Ars, see Pavlock (2009), 22, and below 
for its use in the exile poetry.  
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to imagine that this episode was revised after the exile, the fact that Tiresias is presented as the first 
non-divine uates of the Metamorphoses may already suggest that we should interpret this character 
as a double for the poet. In which case we should notice that Tiresias’ first prophecy as uates 
appears to stand in direct opposition to the authority of the first, divine, uates of the poem, namely 
Apollo, the prophet of Metamorphoses 1.51 Indeed, it has long been noticed that Tiresias’ prophecy 
about Narcissus52 is a patent contradiction of the Delphic maxim, γνῶθι σεαυτόν, to which the 
praeceptor himself had yielded in the second book of the Ars. As I will show, the obvious 
similarities between these two passages trigger a further chain of reflections on the metapoetic 
status of Ovid’s Tiresias and on the generic transformations (this time it’s genre rather than gender) 
in which both Tiresias and Ovid are involved: 
 
ille per Ausonias fama celeberrimus urbes 
inreprehensa dabat populo responsa petenti; 
prima fide uocisque ratae temptamina sumpsit 
caerula Liriope, quam quondam flumine curuo 
inplicuit clausaeque suis Cephisos in undis 
uim tulit: enixa est utero pulcherrima pleno  
infantem nymphe, iam tunc qui posset amari, 
Narcissumque uocat. de quo consultus, an esset 
tempora maturae uisurus longa senectae, 
fatidicus uates ‘si se non nouerit’ inquit. 
                                                (Met. 3.339-348) 
 
He, most renowned by fame throughout the Boeotian towns, gave answers that none could 
censure to those who sought his help. The first to make trial of his truth and assured 
utterances was the nymph Liriope, whom once the river-god, Cephisus, embraced in his 
winding stream and ravished, while imprisoned in his waters. When her time came the 
beautiful nymph brought forth a child, who could be loved even as a child, and called him 
Narcissus. When asked whether this child would live to reach well-ripened age, the prophetic 
bard replied: ‘if he never know himself.’ 
(tr. Miller – Goold with minor changes) 
 
haec ego cum canerem, subito manifestus Apollo 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 On a superimposition/competition between Tiresias and Apollo in the origins of the myth, see García 
Gual (1975), 119, 121. 
52 Incidentally, the first human lover of the poem. 
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mouit inauratae pollice fila lyrae. 
in manibus laurus, sacris inducta capillis 
laurus erat; uates ille uidendus adit. 
is mihi «Lasciui» dixit «praeceptor Amoris, 
duc, age, discipulos ad mea templa tuos, 
est ubi diuersum fama celebrata per orbem 
littera, cognosci quae sibi quemque iubet. 
qui sibi notus erit, solus sapienter amabit, 
atque opus ad uires exiget omne suas.  
(Ars 2.493-502) 
 
As I was singing thus, Apollo suddenly appeared and struck with his thumb the strings of his 
golden lyre. In his hand was laurel, with laurel his sacred locks were adorned; he comes 
closer, a seer to behold. And he says to me: ‘Praeceptor of wanton love, come, lead your 
pupils to my shrine, where there is a saying renowned in fame throughout the whole world, 
which bids each to be known by himself. Only he who knows himself will love with wisdom, 
and will perform all his task according to his strength.’ 
(tr. based on Mozley – Goold) 
 
As noted in passing by Gildenhard and Zissos, with a telling slippage between Ovid and Tiresias, 
‘Ovid[/Tiresias] here rewrites his earlier poetry and dogma’53 as it had been presented in Ars 2. The 
connection between the two passages is anticipated by the relationship between Tiresias and the Ars 
discussed earlier, marking a progression between the themes treated at the end of Ars 1 and the 
programmatic poetic statement inserted in Ars 2.54 The opening phrase fama celeberrimus urbes 
(Met. 3.339) seems to echo fama celebrata per orbem / littera (Ars 2.499) and the use of the 
technical term uates (Met. 3.348, being the first instance of the word in the Metamorphoses) singles 
out Tiresias and Apollo not just as prophets, but more specifically as (Augustan) poets.55 In striking 
contrast to the praeceptor’s obedience to the γνῶθι σεαυτόν, this oracular poet, as famous as the 
Delphic oracle in the Boeotian towns, relates a truthful prophecy about Narcissus which is an 
explicit subversion of Apollo’s maxim. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Gildenhard – Zissos (2000), 132 n. 14. See also Frings (2005), 164-7. 
54 The passage is in clear dialogue with Callim. Aet. fr. 1.21-24 Pf., Verg. Ecl. 6.3-5, Prop. 3.3.13-16, Hor. 
C. 4.15.1-4: see Janka (1997), 363-5, and Sharrock (1994), 197-290. 
55 See Sharrock (1994), 239, on Apollo as uates.   
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Before addressing the question of what this subversion of Apollo’s dictum may imply for a post- 
Ars Amatoria Ovid, it is worth remembering that Tiresias is, or becomes, a prophet in all our extant 
sources, and as such he is already in direct competition with Apollo. The beginning of the so-called 
Sostratus version of the myth56 tells us directly of Apollo’s involvement in Tiresias’ punishment, 
and Tiresias is here presented as a second Cassandra or a second Daphne,57 punished for rejecting 
further sexual intercourse with Apollo in exchange for the god’s teaching of music or, as O’Hara 
more plausibly suggests, ‘prophecy’:58  
 
Σώστρατος δὲ ἐν Τειρεσίᾳ, ποίημα δέ ἐστιν ἐλεγιακόν, φησὶ τὸν Τειρεσίαν θήλειαν τὴν 
ἀρχὴν γεννηθῆναι καὶ ἐκτραφῆναι ὑπὸ Χαρικλοῦς, καὶ ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν γενομένην ὀρειφοιτεῖν. 
ἐρασθῆναι δὲ αὐτῆς τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα. καὶ ἐπὶ μισθῷ συνουσίας διδάξαι τὴν μουσικήν (O’Hara: 
fortasse μαντικήν). τὴν δὲ μετὰ τὸ μαθεῖν μηκέτι ἑαυτὴν ἐπιδιδόναι τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι κἀκεῖνον 
ἀνδρῶσαι αὐτὴν, ἵνα πειρῷτο Ἔρωτος. 
(Eust. ad Od. 10.494, 1665.48ff. Stallbaum) 
 
Sostratus in the Tiresias, an elegiac poem, says that Tiresias was originally born female, and 
was raised by Chariclo. At the age of seven she was wandering in the mountains, and Apollo 
fell in love with her, and taught her music (O’Hara: perhaps prophecy) as payment for sexual 
intercourse. But after being taught the girl no longer gave herself to Apollo, and he changed 
her into a man, so that she would have experience of Eros. 
(tr. O’Hara) 
 
Tiresias’ connection to Apollo in this version of the myth may speak to the fact that Ovid 
presents the bard here as in direct opposition to the god that we have seen chasing Daphne in the 
first book of the Metamorphoses, as if the truth of the anti-Apollonian prophecy of Narcissus were a 
revengeful payback to Apollo for this less known version of the myth.59 Indeed, while Tiresias 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See n. 9. 
57 Interestingly, Daphne (and not Manto) is the name of Tiresias’ prophetic daughter according to 
Diodorus (4.66), who also equates her with Apollo’s Sibyl. 
58 See O’Hara (1996), 183-5. 
59 See especially Tarrant (2005), 87, on how Ovid makes ‘rejected variants contribute by their absence to 
the formation of a new version.’ 
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emerges from both the Narcissus and the Pentheus episodes as a more than reliable uates, Apollo in 
Book 1 is embarrassingly presented as a prophet ‘deceived by his own oracles’ (suaque illum 
oracula fallunt, Met. 1.491), utterly defeated by the more certain precision of the arrows struck by 
Cupid: certa quidem nostra est, nostra tamen una sagitta / certior (‘my arrow is precise, but there is 
one arrow that is more precise than mine’, Met. 1.519-20). Indeed, the god’s long list to Daphne of 
all his powers and attributes (1.512-24), even his choice of a victim who is, after all, appropriate to 
his strengths, only serves to demonstrate the further fallibility of his own maxim, as haughtily 
presented in Ars 2: knowing yourself may serve to ‘love wisely’ (sapienter amabit, Ars 2.501), but 
to love wisely, as Sharrock points out, ‘is not to love at all’.60 In becoming prey to the same furious 
passion of love to which he had condemned Sostratus’ Tiresias, Apollo is presented in Book 1 as 
thoroughly conquered by Cupid. But since Cupid, as specified in Ars 1, yields to the praeceptor (et 
mihi cedet Amor, ‘Amor will yield to me’, Ars 1.21), it is unsurprising that Tiresias, as an ex-
praeceptor Amoris, should emerge from this prophetic competition as the real winner – a victory 
that the Theban seer will soon share precisely with Apollo’s opposing deity, when Bacchus is 
recognised as the truthful god of Thebes and of Ovid’s Metamorphoses 3.61 
An (anti-)Augustan reading of Tiresias/Ovid’s poetic and prophetic competition with Apollo as 
the patron deity of the emperor is at this point easy to come by, especially since the relevance of 
Palatine Apollo is explictly stated in the Metamorphoses (Met 1.562-3).62 However, just as in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Sharrock (1994), 249. 
61 For Ovid’s use of Bacchus in the exile poetry as his patron deity in contrast to Augustan Apollo, see 
Tsaknaki (2014). 
62 I follow Oliensis (2004) in reading Ovid’s emulation of and rivalry with Augustus as not only a stock 
theme of the exile poetry, but a also pervading concern of the Metamorphoses. See Miller (2009), 332-73, on 
(Augustan) Apollo in the Metamorphoses and his interactions with Jupiter, not without an invitation to 
caution in applying too strict ideological readings to Ovid’s pantheon. On Palatine Apollo in Ars 2 see also 
Sharrock (1994), 225. 
 23	  
Tiresias’ previous episode, the message conveyed here is as poetic as it is political. To start with, 
Ovid’s programmatic, yet not unambiguous,63 allegiance to Apollo could arguably work in a poem 
like the Ars, which may at least assume a front of refined Callimacheanism, but the Apollonian 
spring may have to be rejected when dealing with epic and, especially, tragedy – the explicit genre 
of the closing Pentheus episode and the implicit one of Narcissus as a recognised substitute for 
Oedipus.64 Furthermore, Apollo’s injunction to ‘know yourself’ and ‘perform your task according to 
your strengths’ metapoetically implies a programmatic recusatio of higher literary genres that suits 
the praeceptor of Ars 2 in a way that it cannot suit the uates of the Metamorphoses. More 
specifically, from a post-exilic perspective, the obedience to this maxim also caused Ovid to 
remain, as it were, stuck in the Ars, precisely the carmen that would cause his exile. To press this 
line of interpretation still further, the γνῶθι σεαυτόν helped in developing that Narcissistic 
obsession with elegy, and particularly love elegy, that can be recognised as Ovid’s autobiographical 
complex lying behind the myth presented by wiser, anti-Apollonian Tiresias.65 The Narcissus myth 
not only warns poets about the dangers of self-referentiality and self-obsession but also presents 
someone who, just like the poet of the Ars, can never tell the Other from the Self, be that Other the 
literary persona of the praeceptor or the carmina themselves. Indeed, Narcissus’ tragic recognition  
(iste ego sum, ‘I am he’, Met. 3.463) dramatically reprises the confessed identity between Ovid, the 
Ars and the praeceptor (ego sum praeceptor Amoris, ‘I am the praeceptor of Love’, Ars 1.17), 
while his interchangeability with Oedipus looks forward to the explicit comparison between 
Oedipus and the books of the Ars, ‘these latter day parricides in elegiac feet’,66 professed at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 See Sharrock (1994), 212, on Ovid usurping Apollo’s authority. 
64 Already suggested by Loewenstein (1984), 33-56, and Hardie (1988), 86; see especially Gildenhard – 
Zissos (2000), Frings (2005), 164-5. 
65 Pavlock (2009), 14-37. On connections between the Narcissus episode and the Ars Amatoria see also 
Frings (2005), 163-71. 
66 Hinds (1985), 18. 
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beginning of the Tristia (Oedipodas, Tr. 1.1.114).67 From this point of view, Narcissus’ and the 
praeceptor’s following of the Apollonian maxim stands in stark contrast with the anti-Delphic 
model of Tiresias: Ovid’s obedience to Tiresias’ new injunction ‘never to know yourself’ will bring 
about a conversion of both persona and literary genre that will take him through tragedy and epic, 
only to land him again – eventually – in a kind of elegy68 that will be explicitly different from the 
genre of the Ars, namely the carmina of the exile: ‘inspice’, dic ‘titulum: non sum praeceptor 
Amoris (‘say to him: “examine the title: I am not the praceptor of Love’, Tr. 1.1.67).  
 
4. From Tiresias to Tristia 
 
The idea that various sections of the Metamorphoses have been revisited – or even (re)written – 
after the exile is recurrent in Ovidian scholarship but is rarely spelt out. Apart from the now 
commonly recognised post-exilic status of sphragis and proem,69 scholarly caution tends to focus 
either on how exilic poetry activates the post-exilic meanings of the Metamorphoses by a revision 
of the poem’s episodes within the exile elegies themselves,70 or on how the Metamorphoses’ 
historical hindsights into the biography of the poet can deepen our understanding of the precarious 
career of late Augustan authors.71  Unlike the generally accepted revised status of Fasti and 
Heroides, the Metamorphoses are somehow considered more slippery ground, and a thorough 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 On the notion that Ovid may implicitly portray himself as a latter-day Oedipus in the Tristia, see 
Ingleheart (2006), 69. On the similarities between Tiresias and Oedipus, see García Gual (1975), 129. 
68 Cf. Boyle’s definition of the Fasti as ‘an epic kind of elegy, and an elegiac kind of epic…’, Boyle 
(1997), 20. 
69 From Kovacs (1987) onwards. 
70 From Hinds (1985) onwards; cf. Barchiesi (2001), 26-7. 
71 Johnson’s approach (2008), 121-22, although she does not rule out the possibility of an actual revision 
of the episodes of artistic competition in the Metamorphoses. Oliensis (2004) provides a useful blend of the 
two approaches. 
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analysis of their author’s variants and of their possible exilic revisions is, to this day, still lacking.72 
One of the Metamorphoses passages often suspected of post-exilic revision is, as we shall soon see, 
the pendant myth of Actaeon which immediately precedes the episode of Tiresias, and which is 
explicitly singled out by the poet himself in Tristia 2.103-8 as the mythical allegory of the error 
that caused his exile. In contrast to this exilic emphasis on Actaeon, the character of Tiresias is 
never mentioned in the poems from exile, and yet it was the Callimachean version of Tiresias’ myth 
that inspired Ovid’s episode of Actaeon in the first place.73 Moreover, the episode of Tiresias 
appears so dense in exilic language that one is almost naturally encouraged to consider Tiresias and 
Actaeon in conjunction as forming the perfect mythical allegory of the carmen and error that 
caused Ovid’s exile. 
 
Before discussing the impact of Actaeon on Tiresias, let us first turn back to Met. 3.316-38 and 
establish the exilic flavour of the passage. This staging of a mythical trial makes abundant use of 
technical legal terminology which Ovid knew from his legal training,74 and the lines have been 
analysed for their use of judicial language first by Kathleen Coleman and more recently by Kathryn 
Balsley.75 To sum up Coleman’s arguments first, the legal setting begins to emerge in lines 322-3, 
placuit quae sit sententia docti / quaerere Tiresiae (‘they decided to ask the judgement of wise 
Tiresias’, Met. 3.322-3), with the application to Tiresias of the epithet doctus, ‘the uox propria of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 For Ovid’s revision of the Fasti see especially Fantham (1985) and Herbert-Brown (1994), 173-212; see 
Boyle (1997) for a post-exilic reading of the Fasti. Treatment of the Metamorphoses is programmatically not 
included in Martelli (2013). 
73 See n. 9. 
74 See Kenney (1969); Ovid was trained in the schools of Arellius Fuscus and Porcius Latro (Sen. 
Controv. 2.2.8-12), he served among the tresuiri capitales (Tr. 4.10.33-4), the decemuiri stlitibus iudicandis 
(Fasti 4.383-4), and he was a centumuir and iudex (Tr. 2.93-6).  
75 Coleman (1990) and Balsley (2010). 
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the learned and experience juriconsult’,76 the technical use of sententia to indicate the jury’s 
verdict77 and the use of placuit to underline an authoritative decree.78 After the brief digression on 
Tiresias’ sex changes, the trial continues with even more technical language: arbiter hic sumptus de 
lite iocosa / dicta Iouis firmat (‘He, being appointed to arbitrate this playful dispute, confirms 
Jupiter’s sentence’, Met. 3.332-3), where arbitrum… sumere is ‘a standard phrase… for the 
appointment of an adjudicator’,79 firmare can be compared to adfirmare as indicating technical 
corroboration and lis is the technical term for a controversy.80 When the verdict has been delivered, 
Tiresias undergoes a further metamorphosis from arbiter into iudex (iudicis, 335) which seems to 
underline Ovid’s precise use of technical terminology in the passage, since while the arbiter 
‘assessed the validity of competing claims’, the iudex ‘decided which party in a dispute was right’.81 
After Tiresias has been condemned (damnauit, 335), this time with no trial, two further technical 
phrases seal the legal tone of the passage: while inritum facere (336-7) is ‘a set phrase for reducing 
penalties’,82 poenam leuare (338) is ‘the technical phrase for an act of annulment’.83 
On the basis of Coleman’s contribution, Balsley argues that such a shift in the passage towards 
legal terminology ‘represents a move in this scene from a playful mock trial [332 lite iocosa] to a 
very real judgement and permanent punishment’,84 and the episode takes us ‘from a performance of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Coleman (1990), 573; Balsley (2010), 15. 
77 Coleman (1990), 573; Balsley (2010), 15. 
78 Balsley (2010), 15 n. 9. 
79 Coleman (1990), 574. 
80 Coleman (1990), 574. 
81 Coleman (1990), 575; Balsley (2010), 16, 20-23. 
82 Coleman (1990), 575; Balsley (2010), 17. 
83 Coleman (1990), 574; Balsley (2010), 17. 
84 Balsley (2010), 15. 
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injustice to a practice of injustice’.85 The scene, she posits, must be read in the context of Augustus’ 
intervention in judicial matters, when he attempted to control the jurists through the introduction of 
the very mysterious ius respondendi, which possibly gave Augustus’ appointed jurists the right to 
render responsa that were legally binding for judges.86 Finally, Balsley draws attention to the 
double meaning of the word arbiter (both judge and witness) and to the peculiarity of the fact that 
blinding is both the punishment reserved for those who have wrongly witnessed something 
forbidden, and what will make it impossible for this arbiter/judge to be an arbiter/witness ever 
again. This paradox, she argues, can be seen to allude to the reality of Augustus’ autocratic control 
over legal matters, in so far as the episode ‘reverses the standard Roman procedure for the morality 
laws, punishing witnesses before they can punish those who have been witnessed’.87 
And yet there is a final shift that Balsley never ventures to make, perhaps because it would 
necessarily imply an interpretation of the whole passage as a post-exilic revision: I refer, of course, 
to the evident similarity between Tiresias’ and Ovid’s cases, which is further underlined by specific 
echoes between Met. 3.316-38 and Ovid’s plea to Augustus in Tristia 2. Indeed, Ovid himself, as he 
claims explicitly in Tristia 2, acted in the past – like Tiresias – as ‘a judge with no crime’ (sine 
crimine iudex, Tr. 2.94), and he takes care to emphasise how his conduct as a judge had been 
blameless and unworthy of the punishment he received (Tr. 2.93-6). One of the main points of the 
passage is to contrast his strict obedience to the customary legal procedures of Roman trials with 
the unexpected absence of those same procedures when it was instead his turn to be punished with 
relegatio (Tr. 2.131-4). If we accept Balsley’s reading of the punishment of Tiresias as a covert 
allusion to Augustus’ subversion of the legal Roman system, it is hard not to recall that Ovid 
himself had been a victim of this very subversion: like Tiresias, Ovid was not condemned by a 
senatorial decree (nec mea decreto damnasti facta senatus, Tr. 2.131), nor was his relegatio decided 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Balsley (2010), 17. 
86 Balsley (2010), 21. 
87 Balsley (2010), 27. 
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by an appointed judge (nec mea selecto iudice iussa fuga est, Tr. 2.132), but the verdict was rather 
dictated by the revengeful anger of a (semi-divine) monarch: tristibus inuectus uerbis – ut principe 
dignum88 – / ultus es offensas, ut decet, ipse tuas (‘with words of stern invective – worthy of a 
prince – you avenged your injuries, as is fitting’, Tr. 2.133-4). As Ingleheart puts it, ‘Ovid’s role as 
one member of a long-standing judicial body may be implicitly contrasted with Augustus, the sole 
judge with extra-ordinary powers’.89 In Tristia 1.1, we read that the punishment came, like that of 
Tiresias’, from the height of the Lucretian seats of numina which are mitissima, but only as long as 
one does not interfere with their will: esse quidem memini mitissima sedibus illis / numina, sed 
timeo qui nocuere deos (‘there are, I remember, in those shrines deities of exceeding mercy, but I 
fear the gods who have wrought me harm’, Tr. 1.1.73-4).90                   
Furthermore, the previously discussed similarities between Tiresias’ verdict and the opinions 
expressed by the praeceptor of the Ars can now be coupled with the recognition that Ovid’s crime 
in writing the Ars was also, like Tiresias’, a crime of ‘talent’ and ‘judgement’: paenitet ingenii 
iudiciique mei (‘I repent of my talent and my judgement’, Tr. 2.316). This crime was prevalently 
caused by his ‘knowledge’: cf. arguor obsceni doctor adulterii (‘I am accused of having taught 
obscene adultery’, Tr. 2.212), ei mihi, quod didici! 91 cur me docuere parentes? (‘Alas that I have 
acquired learning! Why did my parents teach me?’, Tr. 2.343) and docti... Tiresiae; Venus huic erat 
utraque nota (‘wise Tiresias: he knew both sides of love’, Met. 3.322-3).92 Like Tiresias, Ovid was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Burmann’s conjecture for ita principe dignum, accepted by Ingleheart (2010), 150. 
89 Ingleheart (2010), 117; see also Thibault (1964), 5-11. 
90 On Ovid’s emphasis on ira in the Tristia, see Syme (1978), 223-5; on other Lucretian echoes in Tristia 
1.1, see Hinds (1999), 55. 
91 Ingleheart (2010), 282, accepts Kenney’s conjecture quo didici. 
92 Cf. the futility of teaching love matters in Cephalus’s words: et sensi et docui. sed quid docuisse 
iuuabat? (‘I realised that, and I told [/taught] her. But what availed the telling [/teaching]?’, Met. 7.858) with 
Rosiello (2002), 442. 
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parum prudens (‘too little cautious, Tr. 2.544 and Pont. 2.10.15), perhaps with a hint that he was 
also a ‘too little cautious judge’ (OLD prudens2), especially in relating the secrets of the praeceptor: 
ergo quae iuueni mihi non nocitura putaui / scripta parum prudens, nunc nocuere seni (‘thus the 
writings that as a young man, too little cautious, I supposed would harm me not, have harmed me 
now that I am old’, Tr. 2.543-4). For this reason, both Ovid and Tiresias ‘received the harsh reward 
of [their] teaching’: Naso parum prudens, artem dum tradit amandi, / doctrinae pretium triste 
magister habet (‘Naso was too little cautious when he imparted the art of love, and the teacher 
received the harsh reward of his teaching’, Pont. 2.10.15-6). 
Yet the most interesting similarity between the two events is to be found in the observation that 
Juno ‘grieves more deeply than it was just’, and ‘more than the issue warranted’ (grauius Saturnia 
iusto / nec pro materia fertur doluisse, Met. 3.333-4). In commenting on these lines, Balsley notes 
that the term materia (‘issue’, ‘matter’) continues to fit the legal terminology of the passage, since 
the term is used to describe the topic of controuersiae: by specifying that Tiresias had been an 
arbiter in a controuersia, she argues, Ovid singles out the inappropriateness of Juno’s irascible 
behaviour.93 I would add that the term materia also fits perfectly the topic of a carmen. Still in 
Tristia 2 Ovid claims explicitly that the punishment should have been equal to the materia of the 
Ars (materiae minor est debita poena meae, ‘my subject matter deserves a lesser penalty’, Tr. 
2.516), since what he wrote, although certainly not deserving of praise, were still mere ioci,94 just 
like the iocosa lis (‘playful dispute’, Met. 3.332) that Tiresias naïvely thinks he has been called to 
arbitrate. Ovid further reinforces this point when, in the last lines of his plea to Augustus, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Balsley (2010), 24.  
94 Cf. scis uetus hoc iuueni lusum mihi carmen, et istos / ut non laudandos, sic tamen esse iocos (‘you 
know that this poem was written long ago, an amusement of my youth, and that those jests, though not 
deserving of praise, were still mere jests’, Tr. 1.9.61-2); uita uerecunda est, Musa iocosa mea (‘my life is 
moral, my Muse is playful, Tr. 2.354); magis uita Musa iocata mea est (‘my Muse was merrier than my life’, 
Tr. 3.2.6). 
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stresses again that the exile at Tomis is too harsh a punishment for his wrongdoings, and asks for a 
more peaceful place, which may match his crime more fairly: tutius exilium pauloque quietius oro, / 
ut par delicto sit mea poena suo (‘I only beg a safer, a slightly more peaceful place of exile, so that 
the punishment may match my crime’, Tr. 2.577-8).  
 
This last point finally brings into play the connection between Tiresias and the myth of Actaeon, 
as presented in both Metamorphoses 3 and Tristia 2. The similarities drawn by Ovid between 
Actaeon and his own fate include the fact that the crime was a ‘mistake’ (error, Tr. 2.109 and Met. 
3.142) caused by mere ill-fortune rather than evil intent (fortuna luenda est, ‘ill-fortune must be 
atoned for’, Tr. 2.107; fortunae crimen, ‘a crime of ill-fortune’, Met. 3.141), and that they were both 
guilty of having inadvertently seen (imprudenti…mihi, ‘thoughtless me’, Tr. 2.104; inscius Actaeon, 
‘unwitting Actaeon’, Tr. 2.105) something that they should not have witnessed:95  
 
cur aliquid uidi? cur noxia lumina feci?                         
cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi?  
inscius Actaeon uidit sine ueste Dianam:                 
praeda fuit canibus non minus ille suis. 
scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est,            
nec ueniam laeso numine casus habet.                        
illa nostra die, qua me malus abstulit error...          
(Tr. 2.103-9) 
 
Why did I see anything? Why did I make my eyes guilty? Why was I so thoughtless as to 
harbour the knowledge of a crime? Unwitting was Actaeon when he beheld Diana unclothed; 
none the less he became the prey of his own hounds. Clearly, among the gods, even ill-fortune 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 This has caused much speculation among Ovid’s ‘conspiracy theorists’, on/against which see Hinds 
(2007) and Ingleheart (2006) and (2010), 122, with reference to Thibault (1964), esp. 73-4. On Ovid altering 
the myth in order to emphasise Actaeon’s innocence see Rosiello (2002), 446-52. Emily Gowers points out 
to me that, in contrast to Callimachus’ ‘sexy Athena’ (on which see Hadjittofi (2008)), Ovid never lingers on 
a description of Diana, focussing on the surrounding landscape instead (Met. 3.155-64). Diana’s blush (Met. 
3.183-5), she suggests, may be seen to superimpose on the poet’s ‘descriptive inhibition’. 
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must be atoned for, nor is mischance an excuse when a deity is wronged. On that day when 
my ruinous error ravished me away... 
(tr. Wheeler with minor changes) 
 
at bene si quaeras, fortunae crimen in illo,           
non scelus inuenies; quod enim scelus error habebat? 
(Met. 3.141-2) 
 
But if you seek the truth, you will find the cause of this in fortune’s fault, not in any crime of 
his. For what crime had mere mischance? 
(tr. Miller – Goold with minor changes) 
 
Ovid’s clues about the claim that the error consisted of having inadvertedly witnessed something 
he should not also fits the punishment reserved for Tiresias, a recognition that must be coupled with 
the connections established between blinding and exile in the exile corpus,96 in addition to Ovid’s 
promise to shroud the error in utter darkness: cf. illa tegi caeca condita nocte decet (‘…it should be 
covered by the blindness of the night’, Tr. 3.6.32) and iudicis aeterna damnauit lumina nocte (‘he 
condemned the arbitrator’s eyes to perpetual darkness’, Met. 3.335). Furthermore, another similarity 
between the fates of Ovid and Actaeon can be recognised, as in the case of Tiresias, in the 
discrepancy between the crime unwittingly committed and the harsh punishment inflicted – without 
trial – by an angered deity. However, the only explicit mention of this is found in the comments that 
follow the punishment of Actaeon in the Metamorphoses, which have been subtly compared by 
Ingleheart to Tacitus’ report of the divided views on Augustus’ principate after his death (Ann. 1.9-
10).97 Here, Ovid reports the divided opinion about the fairness of Actaeon’s punishment, noting 
that some found that the goddess Diana behaved indeed ‘more cruelly than was just’:  
 
rumor in ambiguo est; aliis uiolentior aequo            
uisa dea est, alii laudant dignamque seuera 
uirginitate uocant: pars inuenit utraque causas.      
(Met. 3.253-5) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 See Ingleheart (2006), 68. 
97 Ingleheart (2006), 75. 
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Common talk wavered this way and that: to some the goddess seemed more cruel than was 
just; others called her act worthy of her austere virginity; both sides found good reasons for 
their judgement. 
(tr. Miller – Goold) 
 
 
Tristia 2 peremptorily invites us to reread the Metamorphoses in the light of Ovid’s exile. Indeed, 
the whole of the exile poetry, by recreating the myths of the Metamorphoses and applying them to 
the poet himself, makes us complicit in the search for parallels between the life of the poet and 
those of his characters, a search that Ovid openly inaugurates in Tristia 1.1, when he claims that the 
metamorphosis of his fortune should be added to the mutatae formae of the poem (Tr. 1.1.117-122), 
and one that he further invites us to join in Tristia 1.7, with the statement that the carmina of the 
Metamorphoses are indeed a ‘better image’ of himself (sed carmina maior imago / sunt mea, Tr. 
1.7.11-2).98 Ovid’s subtle game of insinuating a post-exilic re-reading of the Metamorphoses within 
the exile poetry is precisely what should make us cautious of entertaining the notion that he actually 
rewrote sections of the poem, if simply because the author is confessing that he is himself capable 
of finding prophetic hints about his future exile when re-reading those very same sections. Actaeon 
is a prime example of this conundrum. Readers of the exile poetry, and of the Actaeon parallel in 
Tristia 2, would immediately think of Ovid’s fate when reading Met. 3.141-2, not least because of 
the explicit dichotomy between scelus and error that would become such a stock topic in the exile.99 
And yet this does not mean that we should rule out the possibility that, since the author of Tristia 2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 See especially Hinds (1985) and (1999). For a list of Ovid’s mythological and tragic exempla in the 
exile poetry, see Broege (1972). 
99 See error… ne scelus, Tr. 1.3.38-9; nullum scelus… principiumque mei criminis error habet, 3.6.25-6; 
magis errorem quam scelus, 3.11.34; error… non scelus, 4.1.23-4; culpam scelus esse negabis… prius obfuit 
error, 4.4.37-9; errorem… non scelus, 4.10.90; in culpa non scelus esse, 5.4.18; stulta… non nobis mens 
scelerata, 1.2.100; see Bömer (1969), 488-9, for the belief that the passage is a post-exilic revision; cf. 
Williams (1994), 175, for caution; see also Barchiesi – Hardie (2010), 70-78, on how Apuleius seems to read 
the Actaeon episode from a post-exilic perspective. 
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was himself, after all, a reader of the Metamorphoses, he may have noticed the dramatic irony 
inherent in his own phrasings of Actaeon and decided to apply it explicitly to his own situation in 
the plea to Augustus – a hypothesis which can be further corroborated by the observation that the 
term error, in the sense of ‘wanderings’, fits Actaeon in the Metamorphoses in a way that it can 
only fit partially the poet of the exile.100 
If this interpretation is valid for Actaeon, the situation may change slightly in the case of Tiresias. 
Notwithstanding the obvious parallels between the Theban uates and the poet, Ovid never makes 
the equation explicit in the way that he does with Actaeon. The version of Tiresias’ myth inserted 
by Callimachus as a frame for Actaeon in his fifth Hymn On the Bath of Pallas is a double for the 
myth of Actaeon that differs mostly in the eventual outcome of the punishment.101 Tiresias too 
inadvertently makes the mistake of seeing a goddess unclothed at the bath (Pallas), but rather than 
being torn apart by dogs, he is blinded and subsequently rewarded with prophecy, longevity and 
mental faculties in Hades (Hymn 5.121-30). Ovid’s choice of Callimachus as his source for the 
myth of Actaeon while going back to the pseudo-Hesiodic version of the myth of Tiresias clearly 
fulfills the two aims of uariatio and metamorphosis needed in his epic poem. Yet the choice also 
allows him – consciously or not we could never tell for sure – to stage what reads retrospectively as 
a double version of the cause of his exile, with Actaeon falling into the error of witnessing 
something he should not have, and Tiresias being guilty of uttering the carmen that told the 
different attitudes of men and women in the art of love. When Ovid invites us, in Tristia 2, to reread 
Metamorphoses 3, I suggest that he also invites us to consider the episode of Actaeon together with 
the subsequent episode of Tiresias, which remains instead unmentioned in the exilic corpus. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 See Ingleheart (2006), 74 n. 3, on the parallel between Actaeon’s wanderings (error) and Ovid’s 
wanderings in exile; yet while the wanderings of Actaeon cause the punishment, Ovid’s wanderings are the 
punishment. On error as uagatio in Ovid, see Rosiello (2002), 426-32. 
101 On the similarity between Actaeon’s and Tiresias’ violation into the mysteries of women’s sexual 
pleasure, see Fabre-Serris (2011), 107.  
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elision of Tiresias from the exilic elegies may be pointed: unlike with Actaeon, an explicit parallel 
with Tiresias in Tristia 2 would have arguably helped little in eliciting Augustus’ sympathies 
towards Ovid’s cause. Indeed, if the error of Actaeon was unintentional, and therefore not a scelus, 
Tiresias’ verdict on women’s sexual pleasure was, like the Ars, an intentional carmen – if arguably 
not a crimen.102 Secondly, while the main parallel between Actaeon and Ovid consisted in the 
unintentionality of the error, the main parallel between the episode of Tiresias and Ovid’s case 
focusses instead on the exaggerated cruelty, and illegal procedure, of the punishment received.103 
The possible allusions to Augustus’ subversion of the Roman legal procedures, coupled with 
Tiresias/Ovid’s payback in his following anti-Apollonian/anti-Augustan verdict, make the episode 
unsuitable, to say the least, to serve as Ovid’s counterpart in his plea to Augustus. Unlike in the case 
of Actaeon, such an interpretation of the episode of Tiresias would be difficult to sustain without 
the assumption that the passage was at least revisited after Ovid had been sentenced to exile; 
however, Ovid’s subtle game of rewriting the Metamorphoses in exile made it so that Tiresias, if 
post-exilic, was meant from the start, just like Actaeon, to be interpreted in line with either a pre-
exilic or post-exilic reading.    
 
5. To conclude, not without a hint of conspiracy    
 
Since we have so far played along with one of Ovid’s intended games in the exile poetry – to 
insinuate a post-exilic reading of the Metamorphoses within the exile elegies themselves – it seems 
apt to take up another favourite game of the Tristia and at least drop a hint of some reasoned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 The carmen-crimen pun is a favourite of the exile poetry, see Claassen (2008), 122-3, 140.  
103  As Hinds (2007), 211 notes, speaking about the sentence would itself already be an act of 
insubordination. 
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conspiracy theory.104 Indeed, if we accept that this episode is an intended allegory of Ovid’s 
punishment for writing the Ars, it would follow that the party offended by the carmen, and indeed 
the divine monarch who sentenced Tiresias/Ovid to blinding/exile was not so much 
Jupiter/Augustus, but rather his wife Juno/Livia, incidentally the same goddess who was also the 
only deity to rejoice at the punishment inflicted on Actaeon (sola Iouis coniunx... gaudet, Met. 
3.256-9). This is all, clearly and exactly, unprovable speculation, but the suspicion that Livia had a 
not uninfluential role in Ovid’s relegatio has often been suggested in the past – and I do not refer to 
the (in)famous suggestions that Ovid/Actaeon saw Livia naked in her bath105 or at the Bona Dea 
rites,106 or that the poet had an affair with the femina princeps,107 but rather to the political analysis, 
inaugurated by Owen and more recently reproposed by Green, that Ovid’s error was somewhow 
concerned with Augustus’ succession and his sympathies for the Julians and Germanicus rather than 
the Claudians and Tiberius.108 The empress, explicitly equated by Ovid with Juno in Ex Ponto 3.1 
(mores Iunonis habendo / sola est caelesti digna reperta toro, ‘having the character of Juno, she has 
been found alone worthy to share the divine couch’, Tr. 3.1.117-18),109 in ‘a poem chock full of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 On Ovid and the conspiracy theorists see Hinds (2007) and Ingleheart (2006), 66. On Ovid’s urges to 
his model reader to ‘read more’ in the exile poetry see Casali (1997).  
105 A view championed by Deville (1859), 50-61, see Thibault (1964), 73-4. 
106 A suggestion by Herrmann (1938), 717, see Thibault (1964), 102-9.  
107 See Thibault (1964), 51-2; on the novelty of the iunctura, see Barchiesi (2006), 105. 
108 Owen (1924), 26-36, Green (1982), Luisi – Berrino (2002), 23-35, and Knox (2004), the latter also 
suggesting that the offence in the Ars lay in Ovid’s panegyric for the young Gaius. See contra Thibault 
(1964), 75-86. 
109 Accentuated by the echo of Juno in Fasti 1: sola toro magni digna reperta Iouis (‘she alone was found 
worthy of sharing the couch of great Jupiter’, Fasti 1.650) 
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unsettling panegyric’,110 is arguably the subject of tongue-in-cheek praise already in Ovid’s plea to 
Augustus: quae, nisi te, nullo coniuge digna fuit, / quae si non esset, caelebs te uita deceret, / 
nullaque, cui posses esse maritus, erat (‘she who was worthy of no other husband but you, and but 
for whose existence an unwedded life would befit you, since there was no other woman who you 
could be married to’, Tr. 2.162-4).111 Both passages set up an implicit contrast between the mores 
preached but not practised by the not-so-uniuira Livia and those lascivious customs that the 
praeceptor suggested adopting, among other places, precisely under the porticus that unexpectedly 
bore her name (Ars 1.72).112 Livia is indeed the Ur-matrona who should not (have) read the poem 
(nil igitur matrona legat, Tr. 2.255) of which Augustus had apparently only heard selected passages 
recited aloud by evil enemies of Ovid (2.77-80).113 And the ideological problem of that poem was, 
as we have seen, Ovid/Tiresias’ verdict on the unrestrained sexual desire of all women, including 
Livia/Juno, whose double marriage, as Barchiesi points out, was not at all elided behind the claims 
to monogamy and the exhibition of priscae tabellae in her porticus (Ars 1.71-2) as a move to 
counteract the erotic pictures and lascivious customs of the time.114 
This interpretation of Juno is not necessarily in contradiction with the previously suggested 
interpretation of Juno as proto-feminist. It is the feminist perspective, in Ovid’s discourse, that 
destabilises the more orthodox principles of the Ars Amatoria and of Tiresias’ verdict, which as 
such align directly and incontrovertibly with Augustus and Jupiter. Thus the episode of Tiresias 
appears to match Ovid’s continuous assurances to Augustus that the Ars Amatoria is after all in line 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See Barchiesi (2006), 115 n. 37, and Johnson (1997), 415, especially convincing on Ovid’s use of 
negative exempla of mythological women in the poem in an implicitly positive rather than negative 
comparison with Livia. 
111 See Barchiesi (1997), 32-4. 
112 See Barchiesi (2006), 101-7. 
113 On Augustus’ unfamiliarity with the Ars, see Williams (1994), 172, 179-89. 
114 See Barchiesi (2006), 114-20. 
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with his cultural and political program, while Tiresias and Jupiter end up uniting in negative 
association against Juno. If we read Livia as Juno in the Tiresias episode, the subversive nature of 
feminist critique ends up superimposing itself on the subversive suggestion that it is a woman here, 
the principessa, who seems to hold the reins of political power. After the fall of the Republic and 
the establishment of an imperial dynasty, any treatment of gender – especially if it involves the 
divine monarchs – must necessarily become a politically charged issue. 
 
In conclusion, the Tiresias episode can be read as a cluster of Ovid’s poetic experiences and at 
the same time as a suggestive allegory of Ovid’s own self-transformation into an exile poet. Such a 
reading cannot escape the assumption of a post-exilic revision of Tiresias in the Metamorphoses, 
not just with regard to the autobiographical interpretation of the passage, but also in terms of a 
poetic reading of Tiresias’ punishment as an aetiology of Ovid’s exilic innovations in the elegiac 
genre. This does not mean that my reading of Tiresias has demonstrated the existence of a post-
exilic revision of the passage, which we will in all likelihood never be able to ascertain: it has 
proved rather that reading the Metamorphoses in accordance with Ovid’s invitation, in exile, to 
insert his own story among the mutatae formae of a poem which he claims to have left unfinished 
(Tr. 1.1.117-122) does not necessarily need to be thought of as a less fruitful experiment after we 
accept the strictly literary – post-Virgilian – nature of the suggestion that the Metamorphoses, like 
the Aeneid, lacked the last hand of their poet. If we agree with Rosati’s statement that Ovid’s poetry 
‘asserts its right to submit to its own rules that reality from which it nourishes, and to turn that 
reality into literature’,115 this also implies that the exile elegies may also have the opposite power of 
turning the previous literature into (autobiographical) reality. This suggestion applies to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Rosati (1979), 106: ‘La poesia non è docile testimone del reale, dell’esistente: essa rivendica a sé il 
diritto di sottoporre alle sue leggi anche la realtà di cui essa si nutre, di rendere quella realtà letteratura’. See 
Viarre (1991), 141, for a slightly different approach, according to which the ‘mémoire mythologique’ 
superimposes itself on the ‘mémoire affective’ to provide Ovid’s condition with a ‘dimension surréelle’. 
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Metamorphoses passim, with the promise of more insights yet to find, but in this essay it has 
prompted the realisation that the metamorphosis of Tiresias is not, or not just, the double sex-
change of the pseudo-Hesiodic version, which allows Ovid to distance himself from Callimachus 
and to justify Tiresias’ presence in the poem. The real metamorphosis is the metamorphosis of the 
author and his poetry, the one that we are enjoined to look for in the Metamorphoses from the 
beginning of the Tristia: Ovid’s transformation from playful, self-obsessed elegiac praeceptor of 
the Ars Amatoria into blinded uates of both Metamorphoses and Tristia. This blind seer is no longer 
allowed to see and recognise himself as love elegist and praeceptor Amoris, he is no longer 
permitted to see Rome and witness its political, legal and poetic affairs; yet in his blindness, like the 
Tiresias of T. S. Eliot, he ‘sees the substance of the poem[s]’116 and their late Augustan changes. In 
the light of his Tiresias, Ovid’s exile poetry proves to be not just the point of arrival in a 
metamorphic poetic career, but also the last and most extreme effort to make innovations in the 
elegiac genre within the theme of ‘transformation’. Like the Metamorphoses’ Tiresias, this new 
poetry is permeated with the memory of the whole of Ovid’s previous career and its generic 
transformations up to the final conversion, which is also envisaged in the famous sphragis of the 
Metamorphoses: the projected fusion of the immortal author and his eternal carmen. 
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